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Abstract. Securitization of mortality risks is an alternative risk
management tool that may have some advantages over reinsurance.
The purpose of this paper is to study mortality-based securities,
such as swaps and mortality bonds, and to price the proposed
mortality securities. We focus on group life annuity data, although
the techniques could be applied to other lines of annuity or life
insurance.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study the securitization of mortality
risks and to price proposed mortality swaps and bonds with embedded
mortality options. Mortality based securities will expand the array of
tools available to insurers and reinsurers to manage longevity risks.
The potential for greater underwriting capacity, innovative long term
contracting, and lower costs make securitization worth investigating as
a supplement to traditional reinsurance.
The longevity risk is a dynamic phenomenon. Life expectancy through-
out the world in recent decades has improved, but that does not nec-
essarily imply that trend can be projected into the future. Mortality
analysis has a long tradition in actuarial science because mortality
trends can have a profound inﬂuence on a life insurer’s ﬁnancial con-
dition. However, since no one can accurately predict the future, risk
management of mortality risk is an indispensable part in the insurer’s
operation. In addition to uncertainty in mortality forecasts, there are
economic and policy changes that make management of longevity risk
more important than ever.
Ten years ago, Friedman and Warshawsky [7] argued that it was
puzzling that so few people avail themselves of the private market for
annuities. They listed three potential answers to this puzzle: Firstly,
people save not for motives related to the usual life-cycle reasoning
but, instead, to leave bequests to their heirs; secondly, most individ-
uals automatically receive life annuities from Social Security and, for
a signiﬁcant fraction of the labor force, employer-sponsored pension
plans; lastly, a more plausible explanation deemed by Friedman and
Warshawsky is that people shun individual annuities because they are
not priced “fairly” in the actuarial sense. Although the individual
annuity market is currently quite small, it has attracted substantial in-
terest from researchers and policy makers concerned with the evolving
system of retirement income provision. In light of baby boom cohort
near retirement, current discussions of Social Security reform and the
shift from deﬁned beneﬁt to deﬁned contribution private pension plans,
Mitchell et al. [11] suggest that there may be increased interest in indi-
vidual annuity products in the future. They also ﬁnd evidence that the
expected present discounted value of annuity payouts relative to pre-
mium payments has increased by approximately 8 percentage points
during the last decade. Thus, from the standpoint of potential pur-
chasers, an individual annuity contract appears to be a more attractive
product today than ten years ago.SECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 3
As demand for individual annuities increases, insurer’s need for risk
management of the potential mortality improvements increases as they
write new individual annuity business. As Rappaport [24] describes,
insurers manage their risk in issuing these new annuity policies, and
are therefore keenly interested in understanding the future course of
longevity, as well as the protection provided by hedging, asset allocation
strategies, and reinsurance. Securitization of mortality risks is another
tool for managing this risk and it has some advantages over reinsurance.
A market for mortality-based securities will develop if the prices and
contracting features make the securities attractive to potential buy-
ers and sellers. We illustrate methods for projecting mortality risk
and portfolio cash ﬂows so that buyers and sellers can understand and
price the proposed securities. If insurers are willing to pay a fair price
based on a reasonable projection and they can ﬁnd counterparties, in-
surers can eliminate their concerns on the possibilities of longevity risk.
Based on the characteristics of the data of the Transactions of the So-
ciety of Actuaries Reports, we focus primarily on pricing immediate
life annuities.
Section 2 covers the potential expansion of the individual annuity
market in the United States. In section 3 we discuss the demand for
mortality based securities. In section 4 we describe how insurers can
use mortality–based securities and why they may want to sell them.
In section 5 we describe the diﬃculties arising in making mortality
projections. We discuss annuity data, including the Individual An-
nuity Mortality tables and the Group Annuity Experience Mortality
(GAEM) reports from Reports of the Transactions of the Society of
Actuaries (TSA). We decided to use the GAEM experience for our
mortality forecasts with a model by Renshaw et al. [26]. We ﬁt a pro-
jection model to US annuity data. In section 6 we discuss securitization
of mortality risk. We deﬁne mortality swaps and show how they can
be used to hedge mortality risk. Section 7 reviews the common shock
model. In section 8 we introduce mortality risk bonds and price them
using the Wang transform. Section 9 is for discussion and conclusions.
2. Individual Annuity Market in the United States
The annuity market, including ﬁxed as well as variable annuities and
individual as well as group annuity contracts, has grown sharply in the
last decade. With the baby boom cohort approaching retirement, So-
cial Security reform, the decline in the growth of deﬁned beneﬁt pension
plans, and the increase in the growth of deﬁned contribution plans, we
expect that the individual annuity market will expand dramatically.4 YIJIA LIN AND SAMUEL H. COX
Baby Boom. According to Mitchell et al. [11], as the baby boom
cohort in the United States nears and moves into retirement, analyst,
policy makers, and advisors in many nations are devoting increased
attention to issues of old-age income security. Increased longevity im-
poses a greater risk to individuals of outliving their resources who may
be forced to substantially reduce their living standards at an advanced
age. Life annuities can play an important role in helping people pro-
tect against risks arising from dramatic advances in life expectancy.
We expect that the baby boom will increase the demand for annuities.
Social Security Reform. In most western nations including the United
States, retirees have typically had access to three main sources of annu-
ities: universal publicly provided Social Security payouts, payouts from
employer-sponsored deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans, and payouts from
privately purchased annuities oﬀered by insurance companies. Social
Security has traditionally been the most important of these three.
Mitchell et al. [11] argue that Social Security reform discussions in
the United States and other nations have the potential to increase the
demand for private annuities. These reforms, if enacted, could also sub-
stantially aﬀect the structure of the annuity marketplace. The existing
Social Security system in the United States is a pay–as–you–go deﬁned
beneﬁt plan. In the United States and many other nations, analysts
have noted with concern the possibility of Social Security system ﬁ-
nancial insolvency, if promised beneﬁts come to exceed system revenue.
This problem already plagues the underfunded deﬁned beneﬁt systems
of many European and Asian nations. While the precise direction of
Social Security reform in the United States and other nations may
be diﬃcult to predict, most proposals that involve increased reliance
on deﬁned contribution-style accounts are likely to result in increased
attention to the operation of private annuity markets. Many such pro-
posals could substantially increase the volume of annuity sales. Sup-
plemental or partial replacement of the existing pay–as–you–go public
deﬁned beneﬁt system with an individual–accounts deﬁned contribu-
tion programs have recently been implemented in the United Kingdom,
Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Hong Kong, and elsewhere.
Deﬁned Beneﬁt Pension Plans vs. Deﬁned Contribution Plans.
Figure 1 shows the individual and group premium income received by
insurance companies for annuity policies over the 1970–99 periods, con-
verted to 1994 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. Poterba [23]
notes that although premiums on group policies were three to ﬁve times
greater than the premiums on individual polices throughout the 1950s
and 1960s, individual annuities grew more rapidly from the 1970s untilSECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 5
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Figure 1. Annuity premium annual income of life com-
panies in millions of 1994 dollars from Poterba [23].
the mid–1990s. In 1994, premium income from individual annuities
exceeded that from group annuities. By the 1990s, annuity reserves
were more than twice the value of life insurance reserves. The long–
term growth of individual relative to group annuity premium reﬂects
both the decline in the growth of deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans and the
rapid expansion of individual annuity products, particularly variable
annuities.
3. Demand for Mortality Based Securities
Insurance risk, usually catastrophic property damage risk, has been
successfully passed to bondholders. These are the so-called cat bonds.
Cox and Pedersen [3] describe a model for pricing cat bonds and several
examples of cat bonds. Cox, Pedersen, and Fairchild [4] discuss the
conditions under which a market for cat bonds is viable. They argue
that, if cat risks are uncorrelated with the stock and traditional bond
markets, then adding cat bonds to the market improves investment
opportunities. An investor with traditional high yield bonds will prefer
to hold cat bonds of the same investment quality, because of their lower
covariance with the market. This helps explain why there were over
thirty cat bond transactions reported in the ﬁnancial press. Mortality
risk bonds will be diﬀerent in several important ways. However, in both
cases transactions costs are likely to be relatively high to reinsurance
on a transaction basis. For securitization to succeed, it will have to be
done on a large scale.6 YIJIA LIN AND SAMUEL H. COX
While rationale for a market for cat bonds was (at least in part) based
on the notion that cat bonds returns should be uncorrelated with mar-
ket returns, we have learned from Sven Sinclair that the same argument
is not likely to apply to mortality based securities. He directed us to
the life cycle theory
... which was pioneered a long time ago by Franco
Modigliani, and has been generally accepted as a stan-
dard macroeconomic model for quite some time, espe-
cially since Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ, in the 1980s, de-
veloped Samuelson’s overlapping generations framework
into a working computational model. The main premise
in the model is that workers save for retirement (by
themselves or through public or private pensions), and
retired people spend down such savings that they ac-
cumulated when they were working. The equilibrium
asset prices in the economy are then inﬂuenced by the
demographically–driven supply and demand.
We are not asserting that mortality securities have a zero beta, al-
though investors will want to know beta. The life–cycle theory may
imply some relation between mortality securities and equity market
returns. However, as far as we can tell, the correlation of unantici-
pated mortality improvement with the market remains an interesting
and open empirical issue. Moreover, while the beta (whatever it is)
may help investors determine a price, beta does not have to be zero for
a security to be viable. There are in the current market bonds with
coupons that depend on interest rates, commodity return, and even
equity returns, sometimes called structured notes.
We agree that mortality–based contingent claims may not be zero-
beta assets, but the argument in favor of a developing mortality secu-
rity market do not rely on a zero beta. Investors may buy mortality
based bonds as a diversiﬁcation, even if mortality risk has a positive
or negative correlation with the market. The risk–reward relation is
what matters. Innovative, long term contracting may bring a premium.
Large scale transactions and technological developments may keep costs
down.
4. Supply of Mortality Based Securities
The same rationale for hedging longevity risk with reinsurance can
be applied to securitization. The advantages of securitization may be
lower costs in the long run, more favorable contracts, and elimination ofSECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 7
default risk. Reinsurance is sometimes used to provide growth capital.
securitization could be used in the same way.
Raising Required Capital. When an insurer sells an immediate an-
nuity, it usually pays a commission (and incurs other costs). Insurance
and accounting regulations require that the company hold capital to
provide for future annuity beneﬁts. It is possible that the sum of ac-
quisition costs and statutory capital required exceed the premium paid
by the annuity owner.
For example, suppose the premium is $5,000,000 for a male annuitant
age 65. The commission and issue expense might be 4% or $200,000.
The total monthly payout is $39,058 based on the average immediate
annuity market quotes in 1995 (about 7.81 dollars per month per 1000
dollars of premium). The statutory reserve is determined by valuation
regulations as 39,058 × 12a
(12)
65 . With level annual interest rates of 6%
and the 1996 US Annuity 2000 Basic annuity table, the liability value
for an annuity of one dollar per year is a
(12)
65 = 10.63566. The problem
for the insurers is that 39,058×12a
(12)
65 = 4,984,891 which exceeds the
net price the company gets after commission ($4,800,000) by $184,981.
This is about 3.7% of the premium. This does not mean the business is
not proﬁtable. On a market valuation basis, the present value of future
beneﬁt (PVFB) using realistic mortality and market interest rates is
less than the premium. That is, PV FB+200,000 < 5,000,000, so the
company adds to its market value on a present value basis. In other
words, the company must dedicate capital to the annuity business in
order to grow. Reinsurance (or securitization) could be used to address
the need for capital as the annuity business grows.
Innovative Contracting. Cummins [5] describes securitization as
the repackaging and trading of cash ﬂows that traditionally would have
been held on-balance-sheet by ﬁnancial intermediaries or industries.
Securitizations generally involve the agreement between two parties to
trade cash ﬂow streams to manage and diversify risk and/or to take
advantage of arbitrage opportunities. Reinsurance is a traditional way
for insurers to transfer their risks to reinsurers, but securitization may
be a viable alternative.
There are some similarities between securitization and reinsurance.
For example, both ways improve the balance sheet because the in-
vestor’s or reinsurer’s return is based on the performance of speciﬁc
collateral as opposed to the overall performance of the cedent or orig-
inator; increase actual surplus and decrease required capital; transfer
the risks and rewards related to the collateral, which eﬀects the balance8 YIJIA LIN AND SAMUEL H. COX
sheet and allow the cedent or originator to divest a noncore business
line or focus on origination and serving.
Securitization Reinsurance
Publicly traded or private
placement
Private placement
Based on liabilities for a co-
hort deﬁned at issue
Pricing and capacity are
cyclical and reﬂective of re-
cent underwriting results
Bonds carry credit–rating No credit–rating for the in-
surance contract
Collateralized bonds have no
default risk
Reinsurance buyer bears de-
fault risk.
Bonds are loans for tax pur-
poses
Reinsurance transactions
can produce taxable income
to the buyer.
More regulatory burden Less regulatory burden
Long-term funding Short-term funding
Exclude or minimize under-
writing risks.
Include underwriting risks.
More regulatory concerns Less regulatory concerns
High capacity Low capacity
Table 1. How reinsurance and securitization diﬀer.
Table 1 shows the dissimilarities between securitization and reinsur-
ance. One of the major diﬀerences lies in the fact that the capacity of
the ﬁnancial market is much larger than that of primary insurance and
reinsurance industries. The bond contact can be customized for the
borrower and lender and could be very diﬀerent from traditional rein-
surance contracts. For example, the bond contract might provide for
30 years of coverage. Transactions costs of issuing bonds is expensive
relative to buying reinsurance. However, billions of dollars of assets
(mortgages, auto loans, and so on) are securitized each year. If the
technology used in these securitizations is brought to annuity securiti-
zation, and if large numbers of annuitants are involved, then the price
per unit may be even less than reinsurance.
While the individual annuity market in the United States is rela-
tively small, there are several reasons to expect that it may grow in
the future. One is the rising proportion of older persons holding sub-
stantial assets in variable annuities that might someday be annuitized.
A second and perhaps more important reason is the recent growth ofSECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 9
deﬁned contribution pensions such as 401(k) plans. Projections of fu-
ture growth presented in Poterba, Venti, and Wise [22] suggest that
the average 401(k) balance for individuals retiring in 2030 will be very
close to the present discounted value of Social Security beneﬁts, assum-
ing the continuation of current law. If demand for individual annuities
increases dramatically, insurers will need to hedge the mortality risk as
they write more new individual annuities.
Long-term hedging is another major advantage of the securitization
of mortality risks over reinsurance. Reinsurance is normally short-term
oriented. Renewing reinsurance frequently may pose higher transac-
tion costs on the primary annuity insurer than those of securitization.
Mitchell et al. [11] describe dramatic advances in life expectancy in
the United States over the last century. Today’s typical 65-year-old
man and woman can expect to live to age 81 and 85, respectively. Per-
haps even more striking is the fact that almost a third of 65-year-old
women and almost a ﬁfth of 65-year-old men are likely to live to age 90
or beyond. Long-term hedging is especially important for the annuity
insurer. Long-term investment products are common in the ﬁnancial
market. The ﬁnancial market can tailor a suitable security for the
insurer.
Eason et al. [6] claim,
... The other issue facing reinsurers is that they also,
because it is insurance, have the same kind of target cap-
ital needs that the insurance company does, which has
typically a higher risk-based capital requirement than a
pure bank does.
Therefore, reinsurers are likely to charge a higher premium than
the ﬁnancial market, if transaction costs are not considered, simply
because they must hold more capital to write the same risk. With
greater capacity, better contracting terms (long-terms, for example)
and potentially lower cost (more eﬃcient use of capital), securitization
will be a better way for an insurer to hedge its mortality risks.
5. Difficulties in Accurate Mortality Projection
General and insured population mortality improves remarkably over
the last several decades. At old ages probabilities of death are decreas-
ing, increasing the need for living beneﬁts. The calculation of expected
present values (needed in pricing and reserving) requires an appropri-
ate mortality projection in order to avoid underestimation of future
costs which will jeopardize an insurer’s business solvency. Overcharg-
ing customers will lose an insurer’s competitiveness. Rogers [27] shows10 YIJIA LIN AND SAMUEL H. COX
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Figure 2. Two views of mortality improvement, rect-
angularization on the left and steady progress on the
right.
that mortality operates within a complex framework and is inﬂuenced
by socioeconomic factors, biological variables, government policies, en-
vironmental inﬂuences, health conditions and health behaviors. Not
all of these factors improve with time. For example, for biological vari-
ables, recent declines in mortality rates were not distributed evenly over
the 15 disease categories of underlying and multiple causes of death.
Stallard [29] claims that successes against the top three major killers
(heart diseases, cerebrovascular diseases and malignant neoplasms) did
not translate into successes against many of the lower ranked diseases.
Diﬀerent Opinions in Mortality Trend.
Improvement. Buettner [2] concludes that there are today two alter-
native views about the future improvement of mortality at older ages:
compression vs. expansion (sometimes also called rectangularization
vs. steady progress), illustrated in Figure 2. Mortality compression
occurs when age-speciﬁc mortality declines over a widening range of
adult ages, but meets natural limits for very advanced ages. As a
result, the survivor curve would approach a rectangle and mortality
across countries may indeed converge to similar patterns.
In the case of steady progress, there are no natural limits to further
reductions in mortality at higher ages. The age at which natural limits
set in does not exist. Consequently, all age groups, especially higher age
groups, would continue to experience declining mortality. The Human
Genome Project is producing a rapidly expanding base of knowledge
about life processes at their most fundamental level. A growing numberSECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 11
of scientists recognize that extension of the maximum life span as a
possibility.
Life Table Entropy. Life table entropy refers to a phenomenon that
further improvement of already high life expectancies may become in-
creasingly more diﬃcult. The gains in survival a century ago were
greater than they have been more recently. For instance, Rogers [27]
shows that the survival gains achieved between 1900 and 1920 are large
compared to the modest gains realized between 1980 and 1999. Hayﬂick
[9] suggests that,
... Those who predict enormous gains in life expecta-
tion in the future based only on mathematically sound
predictions of life table data but ignore the biological
facts that underlie longevity determination and aging
do so at their own peril and the peril of those who make
health policy for the future of this country.
Deterioration. Although general population mortality has improved
over time, the improvement may be overstated. Substantial mortal-
ity improvements often come after periods of mortality deterioration.
For example, between 1970 and 1975, males aged 30-35 saw annual
mortality improvement of over 2%, but this may be an adjustment to
the 1.5% annual mortality decline that occurred during the previous
ﬁve-year period. Moreover there is still a chance for a resurgence of
infectious diseases. Deaths due to inﬂuenza could increase with the
introduction of new inﬂuenza strains or with shortages of the inﬂuenza
vaccine. Rogers [27] argues that although HIV is now controlled, it
is not eradicated and could expand, or variants of HIV could develop
that could increase mortality. Drug resistant infectious diseases like
tuberculosis could increase. Goss, Wade and Bell [8] ﬁnd that age–
adjusted annual death rates for ages 85 and over in the United States
actually deteriorated by 0.72% per year for males and by 0.52% for
females during the observation period 1990-94.
Technical Diﬃculties in Mortality Projections.
Quality of Data. Good quality complete data is a prerequisite for a
reliable mortality projection. However, in reality it is not easy to obtain
data for research. For example, although detailed data on old-age
mortality are collected in most countries of the developed world, they
are not so commonly available for developing countries. Buettner [2]
claims that even in developed countries, the quality of age reporting
deteriorates among the very old.12 YIJIA LIN AND SAMUEL H. COX
The Society of Actuaries’ studies of life annuity experience are of
limited value for several reasons. First, it is not timely. Second, it is
appropriate only for the products the policy holders owned (whole life,
term life, or annuities, for example). So it cannot be used directly to
assess mortality for new products or similar products issued on a new
basis (e.g. underwriting annuities for select mortality).
Thulin [30] claims that complexity of annuity products nowadays
often makes mortality projection diﬃcult. Sometimes, an insurer has
to introduce new entries with diﬀerent mortality assumptions into the
insured pool. For instance, trends in the marketplace are blurring
traditional distinctions in the following two key areas:
(1) Worksite products sold on an individual basis increasingly show
features traditionally associated with group products.
(2) Group products sold on the basis of individual election in the
workplace (voluntary products) with minimal participation require-
ments compete directly with individual products.
They severely limit insurers’ ability to underwrite to discern mortal-
ity diﬀerentials. New sources of underwriting information are becoming
a way of life for insurers, as pressure on costs and hastened issue pres-
sure create an underwriting environment with less documentation and
information. One solution is making more data available to researchers
and making it available sooner.
The Society of Actuaries publishes tables and mortality reports from
time to time. The individual annuity mortality (IAM) tables are in-
tended for estimation of insurance company liabilities. While these
tables are bases on actual insurance industry experience, the rates are
projected or loaded in order to produce conservative estimates of annu-
ity liabilities. Until 1992 the Society published periodic group annuity
mortality reports of actual experience. The reports do not contain
complete mortality tables and they are no adjustments, so these re-
ports reﬂect actual industry experience. We will illustrate the dynam-
ics of annuity mortality with the actual experience from Reports of the
Transactions of the Society of Actuaries.
The TSA [12] states,
...In deriving the 1971 IAM Table, the Joint Actuarial
Committee based its choice of mortality improvement
rates for the period from 1963-71 on the immediate an-
nuity experience from 1958-63 to 1963-67 and the “set-
tlement annuity” experience from 1955-1960 to 1960-
65. Annual improvement rates were developed from the
combined experience for ages 79 and under (1.6 percent)SECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 13
and ages 80 and over (1.1 percent). The same rates
were used for males and females. The committee devel-
oped a set of improvement rates based largely on the
United States white population experience, with some
eﬀect given to the medicare experience and the relation-
ship of annuitant to the United States white population
improvement rates during the period 1961-65 to 1971-7
...
In order to derive a projected 1983 IAM table, a spe-
cial tabulation of the Society of Actuaries 1971-76 annu-
ity mortality study was prepared for the committee. The
committee decided to use the 1971 IAM Table rates had
been loaded for use as a valuation table. If these rates
were used without adjustment in the 1973 Experience
Table, a second loading would be added in the process
of deriving the 1983 Table a from the 1983 Basic Table.
To avoid this consequence and at the same time provide
for a smooth table through all ages, the 1971 IMA Table
rates at ages 47 and under were divided by 0.9 to oﬀ-
set exactly the level 10 percent loading adopted by the
committee for the 1983 Table a.
Based on the above information, we decided that the loaded or pro-
jected IAM tables are not appropriate for our illustration and predic-
tion. We need the actual experience data.
The 1983 Transactions Reports of the Society of Actuaries [16] present
calendar year experience of retired individuals who are covered under
insured pension plans in the United States and Canada. The report
includes experience of contracts providing insurer–guaranteed annu-
ity beneﬁts to ongoing pension plans and experience of contracts cov-
ering closed groups of lives for which purchases are made by a sin-
gle payment at issue (single–premium close–out business); it excludes
contracts which do not contain insurer guarantees of future payments
(immediate participation guarantee contract direct-payment beneﬁts).
The reports summarize calendar year exposures and deaths in ﬁve-year
age groups. Male and female data are displayed by number of lives and
amount of annual annuity income.
The 1983 TSA Reports [16] describes problems encountered in col-
lecting data:
“The last published report of insured group annuity
mortality experience appeared in the 1975 reports cov-
ering calendar years 1969 – 71. It was hampered by data14 YIJIA LIN AND SAMUEL H. COX
collection problems during the subsequent ten years:
several companies discontinued experience submission,
and several others submitted data which were inconsis-
tent or riddled with reporting errors.”
The problems remain although the Society is working now to revive
its experience studies. In the end, we decided to use the GAM Experi-
ence Reports since they are based on actual mortality improvement.
The GAM Experience Reports [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]
describe the mortality improvement from 1951–1992. The Reports give
the number of deaths observed among a cohort of annuitants in 5–
year age groups observed for one year. The observations of deaths
and exposures are summarized in the appendix to this paper. The
Reports provide data, but do not construct mortality tables. We show
graphs of this experience in Figures 3, 4 and 5. It is based on retired
individuals covered by pension plans in the United States and Canada.
We assume that the ratio of the total number of deaths in each group
over the total number of exposures in that group (the average death
rate in that group) represents the death rate of the middle-point age of
that group. We assume the group initially consists of `55 = 1,000,000
lives age 55. The symbol `x is the number of lives attaining age x in
the survivorship group . From the ﬁgures, we can tell that the male
mortality improves more than the female mortality. The combined the
male and female mortality experience is in Figure 5.
Projection Models. Recent changes in mortality challenge mortality
projection models. The competitive nature of the insurance market
means that an insurer cannot raise its price at will. A sound projec-
tion model is crucial to the survival of an insurer. However, the revealed
weakness and problems of poor ﬁtting may arise because most projec-
tion models do not capture the dynamics of mortality that is changing
in a dramatic and fundamental way.
Marocco and Pitacco [10] suggest that a projection procedure re-
quires:
- an appropriate sequence of mortality tables used to express past ex-
perience;
- a model representing the mortality trend;
- the estimation of the model parameters.
Renshaw et al. [26] suggest a generalized linear model which showed
mortality declining over time with the rates of decline not being nec-
essarily uniform across the age range. It incorporates both the age
variation in morality and the underlying trends in the mortality rates.SECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 15
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Figure 3. Number of survivors of an initial cohort of
1,000,000 male lives at age 55. Based on the Society of
Actuaries TSA Reports 1951 to 1991 on group annuity
experience, without adjustments.
The advantage of this model is that the predictions of future forces of
mortality come directly from the model formula. Sithole et al. [28]
claimed that the mortality improvement model of Renshaw et al. [26]
can be derived also from the model formula for use with a given set of
mortality tables for a given base year. We adopt this model for inves-
tigating the performance of mortality derivatives based on a portfolio
of life annuities.
During a certain period, the force of mortality, µx,t, at age x, in
calendar year t, is modeled using the following formula:
µx,t = exp
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Figure 4. Number of survivors of an initial cohort of
1,000,000 female lives at age 55. Based on the Society of
Actuaries TSA Reports 1951 to 1991 on group annuity
experience, without adjustments.
The ﬁrst of two multiplicative terms is the equivalent of a Gompertz-
Makeham graduation term. The second multiplicative term is an ad-
justment term to predict an age-speciﬁc trend. The γij terms may be
pre-set to 0. The age and time variables are rescaled to x0 and t0 so that
both are mapped onto the interval [−1,+1] after transforming ages and
calendar years. Lj(x) is the Legendre polynomial deﬁned below:
L0(x) = 1
L1(x) = x
L2(x) = x
2 − 1/3
L3(x) = x
3 − 3x/5
. . .
(n + 1)Ln+1(x) = (2n + 1)xLn(x) − nLn−1(x)
where n is a positive integer and −1 ≤ x ≤ 1.SECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 17
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Figure 5. Number of survivors of an initial cohort of
1,000,000 female and male lives at age 55. Based on the
Society of Actuaries TSA Reports 1951 to 1991 on group
annuity experience, without adjustments.
The data are the actual group annuity mortality experience for cal-
endar years t = 1951,1961, 1971,1981−1992. Since the GAM Experi-
ence Reports are ﬁve-year age group results, we assume that the ratio
of the total number of deaths in each group over the total number of
exposures in that group (the average death rate in that group) repre-
sents the death rate of the middle-point age of that group. We use the
middle-point age as our observation in the regression. The experience
was analyzed for the middle-point age ranges x = 57 to 92 years for
both male and female with x0 = (x − 74.5)/17.5, giving a total of 120
data cells for male and female, respectively.
In ﬁtting the equation (1), we found that when the parameter γ1,2 is
excluded from the formula (for male and female), all of the remaining
six parameters in the model are statistically signiﬁcant. Although the
six–parameter model which excludes the quadratic coeﬃcient in age
eﬀects from the trend adjustment term was next ﬁtted to the data, the
revised models seem to be appropriate for making predictions of future
forces of mortality. Sithole et al. [28] point out that in searching for18 YIJIA LIN AND SAMUEL H. COX
a model that has a good shape for the purpose of making predictions,
there has to be a trade-oﬀ between goodness-of-ﬁt and predictive shape.
The revised 6-parameter model is as follows:
µx,t = exp[β0 + β1L1(x
0) + β2L2(x
0) + β3L3(x
0) + α1t
0 + γ11L1(x
0)t
0]
(2)
Details of the revised ﬁt are given in Table 2.
Male Female
Coeﬃcient St. error Coeﬃcient St. error
β0 -2.7744 0.0087 -3.3375 0.0111
β1 1.3991 0.0139 1.7028 0.0179
β2 0.1579 0.0171 0.2315 0.0219
β3 -0.2683 0.0318 -0.2181 0.0408
α1 -0.2719 0.0116 -0.2660 0.0149
γ1,1 0.0839 0.0178 -0.1294 0.0228
Adjusted R2 0.99442 0.99301
Sum of sq. errors 0.07006 0.08990
Table 2. Group annuities, 6-parameter log-link model.
All of the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Figure 6 shows the the male group annuity predicted forces of mortal-
ity based on the 6–parameter model given by (2). All of the predicted
forces of mortality progress smoothly with respect to both age and
time, and the model naturally predicts a reduction in the rate of im-
provement in mortality at the old ages. We will use the values predicted
by the 6-parameter model to investigate the mortality derivatives per-
formance. We have a model based on experience from 1951 to 1992.
There are errors in the estimate which should tell us how conﬁdent we
can be in projecting mortality into the future, assuming the dynamics
of mortality improvement continues as it has in the observation period.
This is potentially dangerous. As we have pointed out earlier, there is
a good bit of controversy with regard to the dynamics of mortality im-
provement. We note also that these results are based on group annuity
experience. As the market for individual immediate annuities develops,
insurers will have to adjust their estimates to reﬂect the change in the
market mortality. They may have to apply underwriting techniques
and control for moral hazard when they issue annuities just as they
now do for life insurance.SECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 19
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Figure 6. Male Group Annuity Mortality, predicted
forces of mortality based on 6-parameter log-link model
and TSA Reports 1951 - 1992. The top curve is the force
of mortality for age 85, the one just below it is for age
80, then 75, 70 and the bottom curve is for age 65. The
greatest improvement (steepest slope) is at age 85.
6. Mortality Swaps
Insurers need to manage their risk in issuing annuity policies, and
are therefore keenly interested in understanding the future course of
longevity, as well as the potential uncertainties that they must insure
themselves against through hedging, asset allocation strategies, and
reinsurance. Recently we have seen that reinsurers use bonds with
embedded options (cat bonds, mentioned earlier) and swaps [25] to
manage catastrophic property losses. Based on the above discussion,
no one can precisely predict future mortality trends and managing mor-
tality risks is always going to be a problem so we expect reinsurers will
use mortality swaps and mortality bonds (deﬁned later).
Certainly the dynamics of interest rates plays an important role in
pricing and hedging annuity liabilities. However, we are going to focus
on mortality and take the interest rate dynamics as given and inde-
pendent of mortality dynamics. This is a simplifying assumption and20 YIJIA LIN AND SAMUEL H. COX
one we would like to remove. We became even more skeptical of this
approach after a discussion with Sven Sinclair at the University of Wa-
terloo. There should be a long term interaction with longevity and
demand for securities (and interest rates). However, for now we ignore
the dynamics of interest rates. For example, in pricing a mortality se-
curity we discount future cash ﬂows using the yield curve at the time
the security is priced. The only random values are due to mortality.
A swap can be regarded as a series of forward contracts, and hence
they can be priced using the concept of forwards. We assume the initial
number of the survivors is 1,000,000 at age 55. Our idea of mortality
swap is motivated by the insurer’s desire to pay ﬁxed-level payments for
a series of variable-level payments. The characteristics of the mortality
swap we propose are very similar to the plain vanilla interest swap. So
we call our proposed swap “the plain vanilla mortality swap.”
As an example of a mortality swap, consider an insurer that must
pay immediate life annuities to N annuitants now all aged x. Set
the notional principal at $1,000 per year per annuitant. The insurer’s
actual payments could be used, but to keep the concept as simple as
possible we ﬁx the principal amount as 1,000 per year per annuitant.
Let `x+t denote the number of survivors to year t. The insurer pays (at
least ) 1,000`x+t to its annuitants. The swap is designed to hedge this
portion of the insurer’s payments to its annuitants.
The insurer and its swap counterparty agree on a level Xt for each
year. In year t the insurer pays a ﬁxed amount 1000Xt (varying only
perhaps by duration but not random) to the counterparty and receives
1000`x+t. The insurer and counterparty agree at the beginning as to
the annuitant pool in much the same way that mortgage loans are
identiﬁed in construction of a mortgage–backed security. The insurer
and counterparty payments are made on a net basis, so if there are
more survivors to year t than expected (relative to the pre-set level)
the company gets 1000(`x+t − Xt) > 0. The insurer’s net cash ﬂow to
annuitants is oﬀset by positive cash ﬂow from the swap: 1000`x+t −
1000(`x+t − Xt) = 1000Xt.
Of course, if mortality the other way, the insurer still has a net cash
ﬂow of 1000Xt since the insurer will pay the excess 1000(Xt − `x+t)
to the counterparty. In this way a mortality swap can transform a
segment of the insurer’s annuity payments into a ﬁxed cash ﬂow.SECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 21
Under the valuation model we are assuming, the value of the cash
ﬂow to the insurer (ﬁxed payor) for an n–year swap is
V = 1000
"
n X
t=1
E(`x+t)d(0,t) −
n X
i=t
Xtd(0,t)
#
(3)
where E(`x+t) denotes the expected number of survivors among the N
initial annuitants and d(0,t) is the discount factor based on the current
bond market prices. If the counterparties agree to Xt = E(`x+t) then
V = 0 and no initial exchange of cash is required to initiate the swap.
We point out that, given the distribution of survivors, there is very
little variance in the cash ﬂows. For example, given the survivor func-
tion tpx of `x+t, we can describe `x+t as a binomial distribution. It is
the number of successes in N trials with the probability of a success on
a given trial of tpx. The distribution of `x+t is approximately normal
with parameters µt = Ntpx and σt =
p
Ntpx(1 − tpx). The coeﬃcient
of variation is the ratio of σt/µt. The graph of the coeﬃcient of varia-
tion of the number of survivors for an initial group of 10,000 annuitants,
based on the 1994 GAM female (65) survival distribution is shown in
Figure 7. Note that for a swap of duration 30-years, the coeﬃcient of
variation rises to a maximum of about 1% , so there is little risk, given
the table. The risk arises from uncertainty in the table. In calculating
the swap value, we have to evaluate the expected value E(`x+t) care-
fully. It is not enough to estimate a mortality table and then estimate
the expected value. That approach would ignore the uncertainty in the
table.
In order to illustrate this further, suppose that the possible tables
are labeled with a random variable θ. The the conditional distribution
`x+t|θ depends on θ. The unconditional moments are
E[`x+t] = E[E[`x+t|θ]] = NE[E[tpx|θ]]
Var[`x+t] = E[Var[`x+t|θ]] + Var[E[`x+t|θ]]. (4)
Even if, as in Figure 7, there is very little variance in E[`x+t|θ] for all θ
and the range of t ≤ 30, there is still variance due to table uncertainty
(the ﬁrst term). We have little experience to guide us in estimating the
terms E[E[tpx|θ]] and E[Var[tpx|θ]]. Of course, this uncertainty occurs
in all kinds of mortality derivatives, not just swaps.
7. Common Shock Model
In the section 5, we discuss the diﬃculties in accurate mortality pro-
jection. Rogers [27] states that mortality operates within a complex22 YIJIA LIN AND SAMUEL H. COX
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Figure 7. The ratio of standard deviation to expected
number of survivors of an initial group of 10,000 annu-
itants, based on the 1994 GAM female (65) mortality
distribution.
framework and is inﬂuenced by socioeconomic factors, biological vari-
ables, government policies, environmental inﬂuences, health conditions
and health behaviors. Although mortality among the general and in-
sured populations has witnessed remarkable improvements over the last
several decades, mortality could continue to improve or it could even
worsen. Some events act like a common shock to the entire mortality
curve (e.g., an epidemic ) and decrease the expected lifetime of all an-
nuitants. We can include a common shock random variable that can
aﬀect the joint distribution of annuitants. This common shock random
variable is independent of annuitant’s future lifetime random variable,
in the absence of a shock. This is not the same sense in which Bowers
et al. [1, Section 9.6] describe a common shock. In order to make it
clear we will begin with a discussion of the Bowers et al. model of
common shock.
Lifetimes deteriorate. Let T ∗
1,...,T ∗
N denote N independent life-
time random variables, corresponding to N insured lives observed at
time 0. The common shock, according to Bowers et al., is a random
variable Z which we can picture as “the time of a catastrophe such asSECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 23
an earthquake or aircraft crash.” The shock applies to all lives, killing
them immediately. Thus the life time of the ith life with a shock be-
comes
Ti = min(T
∗
i ,Z).
Following Bowers et al., we can derive the joint survivor function:
S(t1,t2,...,tN) = Pr(T1 > t1,T2 > t2,...TN > tN)
= Pr(min(T
∗
1,Z) > t1,...min(T
∗
N,Z) > tN)
= Pr(T
∗
1 > t1,Z > t1,T
∗
2 > t2,Z > t2 ...T
∗
N > tN,Z > tN)
= SZ(max(t1,...,tN))
N Y
i=1
S
∗
i (t) (5)
In the special case that Z is exponential with mean θ and the lives
have identical distributions with S∗
i (t) = tpx, then we get
S(t1,t2,...,tN) = e
−max(t1,...,tN)/θ
N Y
i=1
tipx
which is a slight generalization of equation (9.6.2) in Bowers et al.
Consider a group of N insured lives, with independent and identically
distributed lifetimes. Let Nt be the number of survivors to time t.
Deﬁne the indicator random variables
Ii(t) =
(
1 if Ti > t
0 if Ti ≤ t
I
∗
i(t)=
(
1 if T ∗
i > t
0 if T ∗
i ≤ t
IZ(t) =
(
1 if Z > t
0 if Z ≤ t
so that
Nt =
N X
i=1
Ii(t) N
∗
t =
N X
i=1
I
∗
i(t)
N∗
t denotes the number of survivors in a model with no shock. It has a
binomial distribution with number of trials N and success probability
tpx. Note that Ii(t)|Z ≤ t = 0 and Ii(t)|Z > t = I∗
i(t) so
Nt = IZ(t)N
∗
t .
From this it follows that
E[Nt] = SZ(t)tpxN (6)
Var[Nt] = E[Var(Nt|Z)] + Var[E(Nt|Z)]
= tpxtqxNSZ(t) + tp
2
xN
2SZ(t)FZ(t) (7)
Note that for the case that the shock has an exponential distribution,
SZ(t) = e−t/θ, the mean of arrival time of the shock is θ, and the
expected number of survivors is E(Nt) = e−t/θ
tpxN. Of course, this is24 YIJIA LIN AND SAMUEL H. COX
less than the mean of N∗
t , the number of survivors in a model with no
shock. The later the mean arrival time θ, the lighter impact the shock
has on the group, and the more the moments look like the moments
of the model with no shock. This type of shock is good for studying
life insurance, but it will not model mortality improvement. We need
another type of shock which improves or extends all of the lifetimes.
Lifetimes improve. Let T ∗
1,...,T ∗
N denote N independent lifetime
random variables, corresponding to N annuitants observed at time 0.
A common shock is an event, like a cure for a dread disease which ap-
plies to all lives and like the previous mortality model it is represented
by a positive random variable Z, independent of the lifetimes of the
annuitants. The life of the ith annuitant, adjusted by the shock, is
Ti = max(T
∗,Z).
We suppose that the mortality before a shock has distribution func-
tion F ∗
i (t) = tqxi and survivor function S∗
i (t) = tpxi. We can now derive
the joint distribution function:
F(t1,t2,...,tN) = Pr(T1 ≤ t1,T2 ≤ t2,...TN ≤ tN)
= Pr(max(T
∗
1,Z) ≤ t1,...max(T
∗
N,Z) ≤ tN)
= Pr(T
∗
1 ≤ t1,Z ≤ t1,T
∗
2 ≤ t2,Z ≤ t2 ...T
∗
N ≤ tN,Z ≤ tN)
= FZ(min(t1,...,tN))
N Y
i=1
F
∗
i (t) (8)
In the special case that Z is exponential with mean θ and the lives
have identical distributions with F ∗
i (t) = tqx, then we get
F(t1,t2,...,tN) =

1 − e
−min(t1,...,tN)/θ
N Y
i=1
tiqx.
Now consider a group of N annuitants with independent but identical
lifetimes T ∗
1,...,T ∗
N, with distribution function F(t) = tqx, and subject
to a common shock Z of mortality improvement. Let Nt be the number
of survivors to time t. Deﬁne the indicator random variables as we
did in the discussion of a mortality deteriorating shock. N∗
t denotes
the number of survivors in a model with no shock. It has a binomial
distribution with number of trials N and success probability tpx. It is
straightforward to show that
Nt = NIZ(t) + [1 − IZ(t)]N
∗
t (9)SECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 25
from which one can derive the moments:
E(Nt) = E[E(N|Z)]
= E[NIZ(t) + [1 − IZ(t)]E(N
∗
t )]
= NSZ(t) + NtpxFZ(t)
= tpxN + tqxNSZ(t) (10)
and
Var(Nt) = Var[E(Nt|Z)] + E[Var(Nt|Z)]
= Var[NIZ(t) + [1 − IZ(t)]Ntpx] + E[(1 − IZ(t))
2 Ntpxtqx]
= N
2
tq
2
xSZ(t)FZ(t) + NtpxtqxFZ(t)
In the case that the shock arrival has an exponential distribution,
SZ(t) = e−t/θ, and the mean arrival time is θ. Since the eﬀect of
the shock is to make all the lives survive to the arrival time of the
shock, than small values of θ do not have a great impact on the group
and the moments of are close to the moments of the model with no
shock.
While we can use a projection such as the method of Renshaw et al.
cited earlier to estimate the pre-shock mortality, we do not have a good
way to determine the distribution of Z. We suggest a a more general
model is needed too. We might allow each annuitant to receive a shock,
but the intensity could vary over the distribution of annuitants. More
data and a richer model are needed. We have to leave the matter of
estimating and developing the shock models as as an open question. In
the next section we consider an entirely diﬀerent approach.
8. Mortality Risk Bonds
Wang [31, 32, 33] has developed a method of pricing risks that uniﬁes
ﬁnancial and insurance pricing theories. We are going to apply this
method to price mortality risk bonds.
Let Φ(x) be the standard normal cumulative distribution function
with a probability density function
φ(x) =
1
√
2π
e
−x2/2
for all x. Wang deﬁnes the distortion operator as
gλ(u) = Φ[Φ
−1(u) − λ] (11)
for 0 < u < 1.
Consider an insurer’s liability X over a time horizon [0,T]. The
value or fair price of the liability is the discounted expected value under26 YIJIA LIN AND SAMUEL H. COX
the distribution obtained from the distortion operator. Omitting the
discount for now, we have the formula for the price:
H(X,λ) = E
∗(X) =
Z
xdF
∗(x)
where F ∗(x) = gλ(F)(x) = Φ[Φ−1(F(x))−λ]. The parameter λ is called
the market price of risk, reﬂecting the level of systematic risk. Thus,
for an insurer’s given liability X with cumulative density function F,
the Wang transform will produce a “risk–adjusted” density function
F ∗. The mean value under F ∗, denoted by E
∗[X], will deﬁne a risk–
adjusted “fair-value” of X at time T, which can be further discounted
to time zero, using the risk-free rate. Wang’s paper describes the utility
of this approach. It turns out to be very general and a generalization
of well known techniques in ﬁnance and actuarial science. Our idea
is to use observed annuity prices to estimate the market price of risk
for annuity mortality, then use the same distribution to price mortality
bonds.
Market price of risk. First we estimate the market price of risk λ.
We deﬁned our transformed distribution F ∗ as:
F
∗(t) = gλ(F)(t) = Φ[Φ
−1(tq65) − λ] (12)
We use the 1995 US Buck Annuity Mortality Tables as initial mortality
tables. The 1995 US Buck Annuity Mortality Tables reﬂect the expe-
rience of 25 large industrial clients’ pension plans. Then we use the
1995 market quotes of immediate annuities and the 1995 US Treasury
yield curve to get the market price of risk λ. We assume a commission
rate equal to 4% and get the market price of risk for males and females
respectively, as shown in Table 3 and Figure 8. The risk loads are
0.1476 for male annuitants and 0.2024 for female annuitants. Figure 8
shows that the market prices of the annuities are higher than the 1995
pension plan experience and the market curve lies above the 1995 US
Buck annuity mortality experience curve. We think of the Buck table
as the actual or physical distribution, which requires a distortion to
obtain market prices. That is, a risk premium is required for pricing
annuities.
Mortality Bond Structure. Like the mortality swap, a designed
portfolio of annuities underlies the mortality bond. Suppose that N
annuitants are speciﬁed, all age x = 65 at the time the bond is issued.
Mortality bond contracts may specify a mortality table on which both
the bondholders and the insurer agree (e.g., the 1995 US Buck Annuity
Mortality Table). Moreover, the mortality contract may also set severalSECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 27
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Figure 8. The result of applying the Wang transform
to the survival distribution based on 1995 US Buck Ex-
perience for males (65) and prices from Best’s Review,
July 1995.
Payment Rate Market Value Market price of risk
Male (65) 7.94 120.91 0.1476
Female (65) 7.17 133.89 0.2024
Table 3. The market price of risk, determined by 1995
US Buck annuity mortality, the US Treasury constant
maturity interest rate term structure for 1995, and an-
nuity market prices (without commission) from Best’s
Review (July 1995). The payment rate is the dollars
per month of life annuity per $1,000 of annuity premium
at the issue age. The market value is the price (net of
commission) for $1 per month of life annuity.
improvement levels on the forces of mortality of each age to reﬂect the
future mortality improvement. In our example, we set three diﬀerent
improvement levels for male (65) immediate annuities:
(i) -0.0055 for age from 65 to 74;28 YIJIA LIN AND SAMUEL H. COX
(ii) -0.0083 for age from 75 to 84;
(iii) -0.0110 for age from 85 to 94.
In addition, we set another three diﬀerent improvement levels for
female (65) immediate annuities:
(i) -0.0050 for age from 65 to 74;
(ii) -0.0075 for age from 75 to 84;
(iii) -0.0100 for age from 85 to 94.
Including the above improvement factors, the corresponding strike
level for each age will be `65+t. The number of survivors `65+t is the
number of lives attaining age in the survivorship group set in the con-
tract. We deﬁne the bond contract so that the coupons are risky, but
the principal is always paid at maturity. The bondholders will get the
coupon payment C if the actual number of survivors at time t is smaller
than the strike level `65+t. Otherwise, they will get nothing. That is,
the bondholder’s payment at the end of year t is
Dt =
(
C if `65+t ≤ l65+t
0 if `65+t > l65+t
(13)
for t = 1,2,...,T where T is the term of the mortality bond, 30 years
when the bond is issued.
Suppose we know the survival distribution for the pool of N annui-
tants upon which the bond is based, so we know the survival probability
tp65. Then the distribution of the number of survivors has a binomial
distribution with number of trials N and success probability tp65. Since
N is rather large, we can use the normal approximation with parame-
ters mt = Ntp65 and st =
p
Ntp65(1 − tp65) to get the expected value
of the bondholder’s coupon:
E[Dt] = Pr(`65+t ≤ `65+t) (14)
≈ Φ

`65+t − mt
st

(15)
where Φ(z) denotes the standard normal cumulative density. Figure
9 shows the E[Dt] for the Buck mortality (female age 65). This is a
calculation that one might perform when the bond is designed. The
strike levels `65+t can be speciﬁed at this point. Lower levels provide
more protection for the issuer and greater risk to the bondholder. With
this mortality bond design, the bondholders are more likely to get the
coupons in the earlier years than in the later years. If we assume
that the bondholder will get the face value when the mortality bondSECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 29
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Figure 9. The expected values of bondholder’s pay-
ment E[Dt] for a coupon rate of C = 1, based on the
Buck 1995 tables for females age 65.
matures, the price of the mortality bond will be
P = Fd(0,T) + C
T X
t=0
E
∗[Dt]d(0,t) (16)
where d(0,t) is the discount factor based on the risk free interest rate
term structure at the time the bond is issued. The face amount F
is not at risk; it is paid at time T regardless of the number of sur-
viving annuitants. E
∗[Dt] denotes the expected value based on the
market mortality table. The survival distribution in equation (16) is
the distribution derived from the annuity market. It is based on the
1995 US Buck Annuity Mortality Tables and the Wang transform (12)
with λ = 0.1476 for male annuitants and λ = 0.2024 for females. The
discount factors are from the 1995 US Treasury interest rate term struc-
ture. Table 4 shows prices for a mortality bond for a group of 10,000
male annuitants, with the strike levels deﬁned above and a 7% coupon
rate. The price of the mortality bond for a bond based on male (65)
immediate annuitants is 930.55 per 1000 of face value. Similarly, we
can get the bond price for the female (65) immediate annuitants is
902.34 per 1000.30 YIJIA LIN AND SAMUEL H. COX
Male (65) Female (65)
Market price of risk (λ) 0.1476 0.2024
Face value 1,000 1,000
Coupon rate 0.07 0.07
Number of annuitants 10,000 10,000
Improvement level age 65 - 74 -0.0055 -0.0050
Improvement level age 75 - 84 -0.0083 -0.0075
Improvement level age 85 - 94 -0.0110 -0.0100
Price 930.55 902.34
Table 4. The calculation is based on large enough num-
ber of independent annuitant lives that we can be the
normal distribution to approximate the distribution of
the number of survivors to each age. The underlying
survival distribution was derived from the 1995 immedi-
ate annuity market using the 1995 US Buck Experience
Annuity Mortality Table as a basic table and applying
the Wand transform. The discount factors reﬂect the
1995 US Treasury term structure of interest rates. The
straight bond price on the same date is 997.14.
Insurer’s mortality bond hedge. The actual annuity payments of
an insurer in the future are based on the future actual mortality expe-
rience. However, we can study how it might turn out under diﬀerent
scenarios. Assume an insurer has to pay a group of 10,000 annuitants
1,000 per year if the annuitants survive at the end of the year. Sup-
pose also that annuity–based bonds, as described above, are available
as a hedge. The insurer insurer sells k bonds for a total face amount of
1,000k with each bond based on the same pool of 10,000 annuitants. At
the same time the insurer buys k straight bonds with the same coupon
rate as the annuity–based bonds. Assuming the annuitants are females,
the net cost of the two bond transactions is 997.14k−902.34k = 94.80k.
The number of bonds can be selected by the insurer and the market.
That is, bond contract can be designed for a given annuitant pool, and
then the bond can be marketed in units of 1,000 of face value. The
annuitant pool plays the role of an index with each bond providing an
embedded option on the index. If the insurer creates a hedge involving
k mortality bonds and k straight bonds, then the insurer’s net cash
ﬂow corresponding to $1,000 of initial annuity liability is random each
year. It can be written as the payments to annuitants, plus paymentsSECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 31
to mortality bondholders, less payments from straight bond issuers:
Annuity payments = 1,000`x+t
Plus coupons to bondholders =
(
kC if `x+t ≤ `x+t
0 if `x+t > `x+t
Minus coupons from bond issuers = kC
Equals net cash ﬂow per 1,000 =
(
1,000`x+t if `x+t ≤ `x+t
1,000`x+t − kC if `x+t > `x+t
In our example C = 70 and `x = 10,000. In this case the insurer might
issue k = 10,000 bonds with a total face value of $10 million. The
cost of the hedge is $948,000 and the hedge provides coverage in each
of 30 future years. The hedge pays $700,000 in each year in which the
number of annuitants exceeds the strike level.
The present value varies with the mortality tables, of course. For
example, common shock improvement Z with an exponential distri-
bution, SZ(t) = e−t/θ as described in section 7 shifts the distribution
of survivors to the right. Figure 10 shows diﬀerent scenarios for the
expected number of survivors for diﬀerent values of θ for a group of
1,000,000 male (65) annuitants. The expected value is calculated with
equation (10).The graph reﬂects one of the mortality trend opinions –
continuous improvement.
One of the most important functions of introducing mortality bonds
is to hedge the cash ﬂows of an insurer and reduce the impact of mor-
tality improvement. The following example, illustrated in Figure 11,
shows how mortality bonds function as a hedge against improving mor-
tality. Suppose that an insurer sells a $10,000,000 face value of mortal-
ity bonds based on a group of 10,000 male (65) annuitants with a 7%
coupon rate and at the same time buys a $10,000,000 straight bond
with a 7% coupon rate. The insurer has to pay the surviving annui-
tants $1,000 per year. If the actual number of survivors is less than the
strike level `x+t in the contract, the mortality bond coupons are exactly
oﬀset by the coupons from the straight bond. If the actual number of
survivors is more than the strike level `x+t, the insurer does not pay the
mortality bond coupon so the straight bond coupon reduces the cash
outﬂow. The total cash outﬂow is shifted down, below is the actual an-
nuity payment level. This is how mortality bonds mitigate the impact
of excess mortality improvement relative to the insurer’s expectation.32 YIJIA LIN AND SAMUEL H. COX
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Figure 10. Survivor curves for 1,000,000 males (65) an-
nuitants, illustrating the eﬀect of common shocks to 2000
US Male Basic Annuity table. The shock parameters
vary from from 3 to 18 in increments of 3 based equation
(10).
9. Discussion and Conclusions
Financial innovation has led to the creation of new classes of securi-
ties that provide opportunities for insurers to manage their underwrit-
ing and to price risks more eﬃciently. Cummins and Lewis [5] establish
that risk expansion helps to explain the development of catastrophic
risk bonds and options in the 1990s. A similar expansion is needed
to manage longevity risk. There is a growing demand for a long term
hedge against improving annuity mortality. We have shown how inno-
vation in swaps, options and bond contracts can provide new securities
which can provide the hedge insurers need.
There is a trend of privatizing social securities systems with insurers
taking more longevity risk. Moreover, the trend to deﬁned contribution
corporate pension plans is increasing the potential marekt for immedi-
ate annuities. This is an opportunity and also a challenge to insurers.
Insurers will need increased capacity to take on longevity risk and secu-
rities markets can provide it. This will allow life insurers to share this
“big cake.” Compared with the reinsurance market, securitization ofSECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 33
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Figure 11. The number of survivors `x+t is on the hor-
izontal axis and the insurer’s payment on the vertical
axis. If the number of survivors is more than the strike
level `x+t, the insurer does not pay the mortality bond
coupons so the regular bond coupons reduce the cash
outﬂow. If the number of survivors is below the strike
level, the coupons are equal and cancel each other. The
total cash outﬂow drops by the coupon amount when the
number of survivors exceeds the strike level.
mortality risks has longer duration, higher capacity and possibly lower
cost. Demand for new securities arises when new risks appear and when
existing risks become more signiﬁcant in magnitude. And we now have
the technology to securitize the mortality risks based on modern ﬁnan-
cial models. Securitization in the annuity and life insurance markets
has been relatively rare, but we have argued that this may change. We
explored the securitization of mortality risks showing how it can help
solve the diﬃculties in managing annuity mortality risk.34 YIJIA LIN AND SAMUEL H. COX
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Appendix: Summary of data
We collected the data from the Society of Actuaries Transactions Reports
for each of the years for which there was data. We used reports for cal-
endar years published for the years 1951, 1961, 1971, and each year
from 1981 to 1992. The last report is based on 1992 experience. We
understand that the Society of Actuaries is reviving its experience stud-
ies.
Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 335.70 11.00 1174.25 10.00 1509.95 21.00
60-64 12102.34 308.00 3847.76 57.00 15950.10 365.00
65-69 39871.68 1413.00 4602.89 91.00 44474.57 1504.00
70-74 17218.98 958.00 1737.57 63.00 18956.55 1021.00
75-79 5873.40 484.00 666.00 37.00 6539.40 521.00
80-84 1774.33 226.00 209.00 26.00 1983.33 252.00
85-89 374.08 68.00 51.25 8.00 425.33 76.00
90-94 47.42 15.00 7.00 2.00 54.42 17.00
Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 1,371.88 36.00 2,454.63 18.00 3,826.51 54.00
60-64 23,718.46 605.00 9,902.34 116.00 33,620.80 721.00
65-69 96,620.43 3,371.00 19,390.30 333.00 116,010.73 3,704.00
70-74 60,560.45 3,371.00 10,594.01 349.00 71,154.46 3,720.00
75-79 26,772.96 2,275.00 3,901.58 195.00 30,674.54 2,470.00
80-84 7,701.84 1,002.00 1,057.17 109.00 8,759.01 1,111.00
85-89 1,717.08 310.00 275.00 35.00 1,992.08 345.00
90-94 254.42 59.00 39.00 7.00 293.42 66.00
Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 3,611.23 85.00 3,574.90 26.00 7,186.13 111.00
60-64 33,806.66 791.00 18,521.74 177.00 52,328.40 968.00
65-69 120,227.85 4,022.00 41,802.04 595.00 162,029.89 4,617.00
70-74 93,795.47 4,955.00 28,542.94 746.00 122,338.41 5,701.00
75-79 63,066.93 5,269.00 16,284.46 747.00 79,351.39 6,016.00
80-84 28,166.41 3,113.00 6,815.79 510.00 34,982.20 3,623.00
85-89 8,022.23 1,315.00 1,699.37 213.00 9,721.60 1,528.00
90-94 1,328.05 338.00 251.95 51.00 1,580.00 389.00
Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 26,599.21 440.00 11,124.59 99.00 37,723.80 539.00
60-64 82,756.29 1,568.00 32,978.18 347.00 115,734.47 1,915.00
65-69 185,232.93 4,924.00 73,727.06 1,003.00 258,959.99 5,927.00
70-74 157,276.45 6,571.00 68,210.94 1,397.00 225,487.39 7,968.00
75-79 97,763.34 6,189.00 42,614.73 1,347.00 140,378.07 7,536.00
80-84 48,755.90 4,727.00 20,588.86 1,093.00 69,344.76 5,820.00
85-89 19,601.58 2,719.00 7,936.75 681.00 27,538.33 3,400.00
90-94 4,980.49 990.00 2,087.62 294.00 7,068.11 1,284.00
Male Female Total
Attanined Age
Male Female Total
1961
1971
1981
Male Female Total
Attanined Age
Attanined Age
Attanined Age
1951
Male Female Total
Group annuity experience 1951, 1961, 1971 and 1981SECURITIZATION OF MORTALITY RISKS IN LIFE ANNUITIES 37
1982
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 28,631.53 453.00 11,754.62 92.00 40,386.15 545.00
60-64 89,455.43 1,753.00 35,433.49 336.00 124,888.92 2,089.00
65-69 192,308.39 5,097.00 75,640.56 985.00 267,948.95 6,082.00
70-74 162,420.78 6,740.00 72,661.69 1,354.00 235,082.47 8,094.00
75-79 103,419.33 6,465.00 48,058.37 1,540.00 151,477.70 8,005.00
80-84 52,549.11 4,861.00 23,671.10 1,231.00 76,220.21 6,092.00
85-89 21,392.48 2,989.00 9,443.51 832.00 30,835.99 3,821.00
90-94 5,716.77 1,082.00 2,526.42 322.00 8,243.19 1,404.00
1983
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 33,163.65 510.00 13,783.18 117.00 46,946.83 627.00
60-64 98,632.53 1,868.00 41,665.68 435.00 140,298.21 2,303.00
65-69 195,074.64 5,153.00 79,663.64 1,103.00 274,738.28 6,256.00
70-74 170,348.65 6,995.00 72,621.93 1,511.00 242,970.58 8,506.00
75-79 107,213.60 6,964.00 48,482.16 1,613.00 155,695.76 8,577.00
80-84 57,936.04 5,399.00 24,237.52 1,388.00 82,173.56 6,787.00
85-89 22,035.27 3,111.00 9,528.77 895.00 31,564.04 4,006.00
90-94 6,136.86 1,218.00 2,725.40 373.00 8,862.26 1,591.00
1984
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 40,574.69 580.00 16,305.25 132.00 56,879.94 712.00
60-64 119,381.14 2,212.00 48,941.94 448.00 168,323.08 2,660.00
65-69 221,883.84 5,695.00 91,062.97 1,241.00 312,946.81 6,936.00
70-74 200,590.93 8,196.00 86,304.56 1,870.00 286,895.49 10,066.00
75-79 129,357.81 8,141.00 60,361.35 2,106.00 189,719.16 10,247.00
80-84 67,297.97 6,288.00 31,781.28 1,771.00 99,079.25 8,059.00
85-89 26,575.80 3,766.00 12,400.26 1,211.00 38,976.06 4,977.00
90-94 7,743.72 1,574.00 3,681.76 573.00 11,425.48 2,147.00
1985
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 43,299.71 656.00 17,016.15 146.00 60,315.86 802.00
60-64 123,040.09 2,386.00 50,603.92 565.00 173,644.01 2,951.00
65-69 223,999.93 6,226.00 93,571.37 1,368.00 317,571.30 7,594.00
70-74 207,718.42 9,000.00 90,306.94 2,050.00 298,025.36 11,050.00
75-79 137,102.94 9,186.00 65,194.85 2,426.00 202,297.79 11,612.00
80-84 71,953.72 7,141.00 35,412.31 2,137.00 107,366.03 9,278.00
85-89 28,655.87 4,287.00 14,095.45 1,437.00 42,751.32 5,724.00
90-94 8,411.94 1,812.00 4,179.97 671.00 12,591.91 2,483.00
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1986
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 44,010.72 627.00 16,677.86 112.00 60,688.58 739.00
60-64 122,620.42 2,163.00 50,381.10 476.00 173,001.52 2,639.00
65-69 227,995.35 5,699.41 95,512.26 1,261.00 323,507.61 6,960.41
70-74 216,055.50 8,098.29 93,727.78 1,966.00 309,783.28 10,064.29
75-79 146,182.97 8,610.00 68,834.32 2,324.00 215,017.29 10,934.00
80-84 78,070.67 7,153.00 38,836.55 2,108.00 116,907.22 9,261.00
85-89 31,484.42 4,005.00 15,650.49 1,406.00 47,134.91 5,411.00
90-94 9,097.10 1,678.00 4,672.65 690.00 13,769.75 2,368.00
1987
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 47,303.94 598.00 17,781.62 134.00 65,085.56 732.00
60-64 129,028.29 2,138.00 53,226.99 533.00 182,255.28 2,671.00
65-69 238,848.85 5,773.00 101,240.19 1,356.00 340,089.04 7,129.00
70-74 223,665.17 8,714.00 98,442.35 2,054.00 322,107.52 10,768.00
75-79 157,461.29 9,443.00 74,752.64 2,525.00 232,213.93 11,968.00
80-84 83,820.45 7,671.00 43,600.05 2,452.00 127,420.50 10,123.00
85-89 34,094.97 4,590.00 18,036.28 1,677.00 52,131.25 6,267.00
90-94 9,836.78 1,921.00 5,395.54 825.00 15,232.32 2,746.00
1988
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 49,424.32 683.00 18,162.87 141.00 67,587.19 824.00
60-64 132,778.58 2,252.00 53,788.54 513.00 186,567.12 2,765.00
65-69 235,874.82 5,587.00 102,022.53 1,295.00 337,897.35 6,882.00
70-74 221,164.05 8,388.00 99,853.21 2,116.00 321,017.26 10,504.00
75-79 162,202.31 9,530.00 78,542.78 2,630.00 240,745.09 12,160.00
80-84 88,225.65 8,012.00 47,418.51 2,583.00 135,644.16 10,595.00
85-89 35,929.54 4,707.00 20,142.57 1,879.00 56,072.11 6,586.00
90-94 10,484.98 2,002.00 5,926.74 845.00 16,411.72 2,847.00
1989
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 45,167.60 580.00 19,788.90 138.00 64,956.50 718.00
60-64 120,348.84 2,008.00 53,312.98 488.00 173,661.82 2,496.00
65-69 201,223.57 4,827.00 94,345.49 1,235.00 295,569.06 6,062.00
70-74 180,723.00 6,748.00 88,016.87 1,829.00 268,739.87 8,577.00
75-79 134,297.88 7,852.00 70,107.48 2,357.00 204,405.36 10,209.00
80-84 72,524.22 6,606.00 41,921.07 2,353.00 114,445.29 8,959.00
85-89 29,672.14 3,992.00 18,031.93 1,628.00 47,704.07 5,620.00
90-94 8,245.34 1,704.00 5,114.09 820.00 13,359.43 2,524.00
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1990
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 53,375.95 686.00 24,851.00 174.00 78,226.95 860.00
60-64 146,190.29 2,333.00 67,235.53 596.00 213,425.82 2,929.00
65-69 258,735.98 5,949.00 122,669.86 1,562.00 381,405.84 7,511.00
70-74 238,694.07 8,911.00 116,031.28 2,327.00 354,725.35 11,238.00
75-79 189,088.76 11,105.00 95,064.28 3,186.00 284,153.04 14,291.00
80-84 109,583.14 9,912.00 62,967.19 3,520.00 172,550.33 13,432.00
85-89 48,022.47 6,572.00 30,700.37 2,778.00 78,722.84 9,350.00
90-94 14,672.14 2,842.00 10,005.89 1,445.00 24,678.03 4,287.00
1991
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 50,731.54 661.00 22,245.01 158.00 72,976.55 819.00
60-64 137,582.08 2,383.00 60,722.23 543.00 198,304.31 2,926.00
65-69 240,820.91 5,774.00 114,994.74 1,557.00 355,815.65 7,331.00
70-74 230,909.08 8,685.00 115,825.34 2,433.00 346,734.42 11,118.00
75-79 188,317.23 10,961.00 96,727.27 3,360.00 285,044.50 14,321.00
80-84 112,587.59 10,048.00 66,245.62 3,791.00 178,833.21 13,839.00
85-89 48,883.89 6,713.00 33,022.70 2,996.00 81,906.59 9,709.00
90-94 15,033.98 2,901.00 10,909.55 1,624.00 25,943.53 4,525.00
1992
Male Female Total
Attained Age Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths Exposure Deaths
55-59 47,790.52 689.00 20,925.44 156.00 68,715.96 845.00
60-64 122,033.83 2,143.00 55,616.52 466.00 177,650.35 2,609.00
65-69 216,153.60 5,124.00 107,068.38 1,429.00 323,221.98 6,553.00
70-74 212,415.17 7,526.00 111,099.67 2,260.00 323,514.84 9,786.00
75-79 173,061.53 9,440.00 91,863.84 3,044.00 264,925.37 12,484.00
80-84 106,152.91 9,177.00 63,719.81 3,349.00 169,872.72 12,526.00
85-89 47,214.93 6,190.00 33,278.32 2,984.00 80,493.25 9,174.00
90-94 15,059.41 2,859.00 11,268.86 1,634.00 26,328.27 4,493.00
Group annuity experience 1990 – 1992
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